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The Consistency of Qualitative
Hedonism and the Value of (at
Least Some) Malicious Pleasures
GUY FLETCHER
University of Reading
In this article, I examine two of the standard objections to forms of value hedonism.
The first is the common claim, most famously made by Bradley and Moore, that Mill’s
qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. The second is the apparent problem for quantitative
hedonism in dealing with malicious pleasures. I argue that qualitative hedonism is
consistent, even if it is implausible on other grounds. I then go on to show how our
intuitions about malicious pleasure might be misleading.
1. PRELIMINARIES
First, I need to explain what I mean by hedonism. The formulation of
the basic form of hedonism that I shall discuss here is:1
(HP1) Only tokens of pleasure or pain bear final value or disvalue.
(HP2) All tokens of pleasure bear final value.
(HP3) All tokens of pain bear final disvalue.
FollowingKorsgaard and others, I use ‘final value’ rather than ‘intrinsic
value’ to refer to something’s being good ‘for its own sake’ or ‘as an
end’.2 This is partly because of the ambiguity of the term ‘intrinsic
value’ but also in keeping with Mill’s discussion. This is because, at
least in Utilitarianism, Mill talked mostly of things being ‘desirable
as an end’, ‘valuable’, or as an ‘ultimate end’, rather than their being
‘intrinsically valuable’.3 Furthermore, some of the few times Mill does
talk of ‘intrinsic good’ he appears to use the term as a contrast to things
being a means to a good, an idea better expressed by ‘good as an end’
or ‘finally valuable’ than by ‘intrinsically valuable’.4
For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Brad Hooker, Penelope
Mackie and Chris Woodard.
1 For discussion of how to formulate hedonism (though specifically hedonism as a
theory of well-being) see F. Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature,
Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism (Oxford, 2004).
2 C. Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, Philosophical Review 92 (1983),
pp. 169–95. See also, W. Rabinowicz and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, ‘A Distinction in Value:
Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake’, Recent Work On Intrinsic Value, ed. W. Rabinowicz
& T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (Dordrect, 2005), pp. 115–30. Compare S. Kagan, ‘Rethinking
Intrinsic Value’, Journal of Ethics 2 (1998), pp. 277–97.
3 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. G. Sher, 2nd edn. (London, 1863; Indianapolis, 2001).
4 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 41, cf. pp. 8, 10.
© 2008 Cambridge University Press Utilitas Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2008
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This formulation of hedonismmakes clear that it is a theory of what is
finally good and is silent on questions of rightness. Failing to recognize
this can lead to mistakes about the sorts of claims that hedonism is
committed to. One such error would be to reason from the fact that
the outcome in which K performs ϕ contains more value than any
alternative possible outcome, to the conclusion that it would be right
for K to ϕ.
Such reasoning is wrong as it assumes that the deontic status of
acts derives solely from the value properties of states of affairs. Whilst
some normative theories – such as act-consequentialism – do hold this,
it is false that hedonism entails anything about rightness. Adopting
hedonism as a theory of the good does not commit one to any view
about the nature of rightness and its relatedness, or non-relatedness,
to goodness.
We can combine hedonism with both deontological and teleological
normative theories. A familiar example of the latter is hedonistic
act-utilitarianism, which combines the hedonist theory of good with
the fundamental tenets of utilitarianism. Hedonistic act-utilitarianism
would hold that all agents have the same basic requirement – to
generate as much net pleasure as possible. Conversely, we could
combine hedonism with a deontological moral theory such as Nozick’s
side-constraint theory.5 Whilst this would be an unusual combination,
it would not be an incoherent one. It would hold that pleasure is finally
good, but that the value of resultant states of affairs does not provide
reasons for action. For example, to ϕ is permissible not because it will
produce a valuable state of affairs, but for some other reason – such as
its respecting the natural rights of agents.
There are two other issues I will mention briefly. First, we can
distinguish between hedonism as a theory of well-being, and hedonism
as a theory of value. Hedonism as a theory of well-being has a narrower
scope as it holds that pleasure and pain are the only factors which
determine ‘what makes someone’s life go best’.6 A hedonist theory of
value has a wider scope as it holds that pleasure and pain are the only
things which determine the value of outcomes as a whole. This article
is about hedonism as a theory of value.
The second issue to set aside is the ‘paradox of hedonism’. The
paradox, as described by Sidgwick amongst others, is that agents
who strive directly for their own pleasure tend to generate it less
successfully than those who strive for other goals.7 Whilst neither
5 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford, 1974), p. 28.
6 Term taken from D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1987), p. 493.
7 H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London, 1907; Indianapolis, 1981),
p. 136.
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alleging nor denying the existence of the paradox, I want to make clear
that, even if the paradox is real, it does not undermine the claim that
hedonism is a true account of what is good as an end. This can be seen
by differentiating between hedonism as an account of value, and as a
conscious guide to action. Whilst it may be true that those attempting
to generate pleasure are less likely to generate pleasure by deliberately
striving for it, this does not undermine the claim that what is good as
an end, aside from the issue of how it is most successfully generated, is
pleasure. The paradox might point out a surprising feature of attempts
to generate what is valuable but this does not damage hedonism as an
account of what is good as an end.
2. QUALITATIVE HEDONISM
Worries about the inability of hedonism to value pleasures on non-
quantitative grounds, namely grounds other than their intensity and
duration, are long-standing. Hedonists are often perceived to face a
dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma is that if hedonists refuse
to recognize qualitative differences in pleasures and retain a purely
quantitative form of hedonism then they are committed to counter-
intuitive implications. The second horn is that a qualitative form of
hedonism would be a contradiction and would actually involve the
abandonment of hedonism and adoption of value pluralism. My aim
here is to show that qualitative hedonism is not contradictory, and thus
that hedonism may be able to avoid the second horn of the dilemma.
The most plausible interpretation of Mill is that he holds a form
of qualitative hedonism in which certain pleasures are more valuable
than others, even when the quantities are equal.8 Mill claims that:
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that
some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It
would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered
as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend
on quantity alone.9
For example, qualitative hedonism might hold that an instance of
pleasure from reading Plato, with a duration of 20 and an intensity
of 10, is more valuable than an instance of pleasure from skimming
stones, despite its also having a duration of 20 and an intensity of
10. So, the qualitative hedonist sees the value of pleasure as being
determined by three variables: duration, intensity and quality.
8 For discussion of whether Mill actually intended to defend qualitative hedonism see
J. Riley, ‘Is Qualitative Hedonism Incoherent?’, Utilitas 11 (1999), pp. 347–59; G. Scarre,
‘Donner and Riley on Qualitative Hedonism’, Utilitas 9 (1997), pp. 351–60.
9 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 8.
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The first argument against qualitative hedonism is from Moore
who claims that qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. One route to
Moore’s conclusion is to simply assert that hedonismmust take a purely
quantitative form, by specifying that pleasures can vary only according
to their quantity, and thus that the value of pleasure can only be a
function of intensity and duration. Moore makes this point by asking
‘Can one pleasure be pleasanter than another, except in the sense that
it gives more pleasure?’10
As discussed by Crisp and others, Moore’s claim arguably begs the
question against qualitative hedonism by assuming that hedonism can
only take a quantitative form.11 Whilst it is true that Mill’s qualitative
hedonism is inconsistent with formulations of hedonism that require
it to take a purely quantitative form, it is dialectically uninteresting
to resolve the inconsistency by adjudging qualitative hedonism as
incoherent on that ground alone, without providing an independent
ground for rejecting the notion of qualitative variation in pleasures.
A more interesting argument for the inconsistency of qualitative
hedonism is one made by Bradley as follows:
Higher then, . . .has no meaning at all, unless we go to something outside
pleasure, for we may not go to quantity of pleasure. But, if we go outside
pleasure, not only have we given up the greatest amount theory, but we have
thrown over Hedonism altogether.12
Moore seems to make the same point by saying:
I have pointed out that, if you say, as Mill does, that quality of pleasure is to be
taken into account, then you are no longer holding that pleasure alone is good
as an end, since you imply that something else, something which is not present
in all pleasures, is also good as an end.13
The claim is that by introducing quality as a determinant of the value
of pleasure, qualitative hedonism abandons value monism and allows
something other than pleasure to be good as an end.
This claim is false because there can be monistic forms of qualitative
hedonism. Returning to the example of reading Plato versus skimming
stones, qualitative hedonism need not ascribe additional final value
to the reading of Plato, as compared with skimming stones. Rather,
it ascribes additional value to the pleasure of reading as opposed to
the pleasure of skimming stones. The Bradley–Moore claim would be
10 G. E. Moore, Principa Ethica (Cambridge, 1903; Cambridge, 1993), p. 130; italics in
original.
11 For example, R. Crisp, Routledge Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism (London,
1997); J. Riley, ‘Is Qualitative Hedonism Incoherent?’; M. J. Zimmerman, ‘Mill and the
Consistency of Hedonism’, Philosophia 83 (1983), pp. 317–36.
12 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (London, 1927), pp. 119–20; italics in original.
13 Moore, Principia, p. 132; italics in original.
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correct if a qualitative hedonist held that there is final value in reading
Plato without enjoyment. Yet, it is clear that a qualitative hedonist
need not make such a claim. We can formulate a consistent version of
qualitative hedonism as follows:
(1) Tokens of pleasure are all, and the only, bearers of final value.
(2) Tokens of pain are all, and the only, bearers of final disvalue.
(3) The final value of a token of pleasure is a function of its intensity,
duration and quality where:
(a) A more intense pleasure has greater final value, ceteris
paribus, than a less intense pleasure.
(b) A longer-length pleasure has greater final value, ceteris
paribus, than a shorter-length pleasure.
(c) A higher-quality pleasure has greater final value, ceteris
paribus, than a lower-quality pleasure.
It is clear that qualitative hedonism is monistic in that it allows
pleasure and pain alone to be bearers of final value and disvalue. The
Bradley–Moore claim – that qualitative hedonismmust ascribe value to
something other than pleasure – seems to presuppose that qualitative
hedonism holds something like the following:
(1) Tokens of pleasure are all, and the only, bearers of final value.
(2) Tokens of pain are all, and the only, bearers of final disvalue.
(4) Activities vary in their final value, according to their quality.
(4) contradicts (1) and (2) by allowing things other than pleasure
and pain (activities) to be bearers of final value. But, if the qualitative
hedonist actually holds (1), (2) and (3) then he is clearly not abandoning
the monistic element of hedonism. He simply holds that the final value
of an instance of pleasure is determined by three factors: intensity,
duration and quality.
If we look again at the quotation from Mill we are reminded that
his claim is that different kinds of pleasure are of different value.
Thus, Mill’s qualitative hedonism is not committed, pace Bradley
and Moore, to claiming that A’s reading Plato without pleasure is
more valuable than B’s skimming stones without pleasure. Rather,
qualitative hedonism would say that the fact that neither agent
experiences pleasure means that there is no final value in either
situation, so the issue of qualitative superiority cannot arise.
At the heart of the argument against qualitative hedonism is the idea
that it allows other values, such as knowledge, to creep into the list of
bearers of final value, thus making it pluralistic. As I have shown, this
is mistaken. Qualitative hedonism is not inconsistent. Although it is
consistent, it is much less clear that qualitative hedonism is plausible,
and it is to this issue that I will now move.
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In fairness to Bradley and Moore, it may be that their objection to
qualitative hedonism was a reasonable worry about the introduction
of quality as a determinant of the value of pleasure being unmotivated
and that they conflate this with the question of whether qualitative
hedonism is monistic.14 The difficulty for the proponent of qualitative
hedonism is to specify exactly how the quality of a pleasure affects its
value. I have shown that qualitative hedonism is neither inconsistent
nor pluralistic, but this does not provide grounds for thinking that
qualitative variation of pleasures is well motivated. As Feldman points
out, it is inadequate to take as a motivation for qualitative hedonism
the fact that it supports the intuitively ‘right’ answer when it comes
to comparing the values of reading Plato and skimming stones.15 The
qualitative hedonist needs to give a good justification for the claim that
quality can affect the value of a token of pleasure and how it can do so
without itself being valuable.
A qualitative hedonist could simply stipulate that quality ‘just does’
contribute to the value of pleasure, in the same way that an increase
in the intensity or duration of a pleasure increases its final value.16 Yet
the obvious response is to say that there is strong intuitive support for
the claim that the value of pleasure is increased when it is more intense
or of longer duration, so it is not difficult to see why such quantitative
factors affect the final value of an instance of pleasure. By contrast,
the notion of quality remains somewhat mysterious. It does not seem
that what Mill would regard as higher pleasures feel superior to lower
pleasures. Nor is it clear how the pleasure an agent gets from reading
poetry is better than an equal-sized pleasure from playing skittles,
other things being equal.
I have shown why the common objection to qualitative hedonism –
that it is pluralistic – is mistaken. Qualitative hedonists can bemonists
about value. Yet, as I have briefly explained, such forms of qualitative
hedonism require a lot to motivate them, as quality does not seem on
‘all fours’ with intensity and duration as being a determinant of the
value of a pleasure. But this is not to say that it cannot be done.
3. MALICIOUS PLEASURES
Another standard objection to hedonism is the objection frommalicious
pleasures. This objection attacks (HP2) from my formulation of
14 Of course, in Moore’s case, it is also likely that he was already presupposing aspects
of his theory of intrinsic value, outlined in ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’ in his
Philosophical Studies (London, 1922).
15 Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life, p. 78. As noted above (n. 1) Feldman’s point
comes in a discussion of qualitative hedonism as an account of well-being.
16 See for example Crisp, Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism, pp. 33–4.
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hedonism above by claiming that some pleasures either hold zero final
value or final disvalue (hereafter ‘value’/‘disvalue’ unless otherwise
specified).
Of course, hedonism is committed to ascribing equal final value
to malicious pleasure, all things being equal, as to equal sized non-
malicious pleasures. Rather than attempting to avoid this conclusion,
my aim in this section is to explain how it might be less counterintuitive
to assign final value to malicious pleasures by showing how our
intuitions can go awry on the issue. I believe that some of our
judgements about malicious pleasures are illegitimately affected by
considerations of: the wrongness of acts, the disvalue of people’s being
capable of experiencing malicious pleasure, and the gratuitous badness
of outcomes.
When considering the objection from malicious pleasures against
hedonism we should focus on the salient issue: malicious pleasure.
Compare the following cases:
(1) X plays football with Y for pleasure, generating net amount of
pleasure P.
(2) X tortures Y for pleasure, generating net amount of pleasure
greater than P.
Someone might claim that hedonism cannot give a reason for thinking
that X should do (1) rather than (2), because of the greater amount of
pleasure in (2). Yet, as explained earlier, hedonism makes no deontic
claims. So, whilst hedonism cannot say that (1) is more valuable than
(2), because of the greater pleasure in the latter, this does not commit
it to saying that the act performed in (2) is right. Only if one assumes
a perfect relationship between evaluative properties of states of affairs
and deontic properties of acts does one get such a result, and hedonism
does not entail this, or any other, relationship.
This point is important because pairs of cases such as (1) and (2)
are likely to give illegitimate support for the objection from malicious
pleasures by introducing considerations of the wrongness of acts, and
of the pain of the person who is the object of the malicious pleasure.
Thus, if we want to examine the objection from malicious pleasures we
should compare pairs of cases in which the act is the same and the
only salient difference is the presence of malicious pleasure, as in the
following:
Case Act Pleasure (X) Pain (Y)
3 X tortures Y 0 −100
4 X tortures Y 50 −100
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By making this comparison we focus on the salient issue – whether
X’s experiencing pleasure from the act makes outcome (4) better.
Distracting issues are filtered out because the act X performs is the
same in both cases, as is the pain experienced by Y.
This helps perhaps to make it less counter-intuitive to ascribe
final value to the pleasure of torture because it prevents us from,
illegitimately, comparing the ascription of final value to pleasures
stemming from malicious acts with the ascription of final value to a
pleasure stemming from non-malicious acts.
However, even in a comparatively pure case such as this, there are
likely to be other distracting issues that affect our intuitions. The first
of these is that despite the pain of Y being stipulated as equal in the
two cases, it is probable that in a situation in which X tortures Y, Y’s
being aware that X is enjoying the act is likely to increase the pain
experienced by Y. We should, therefore, also stipulate that the pleasure
experienced by X is indiscernible, and keep in mind that Y’s pain is a
constant.
Another important consideration is that, when we are thinking about
examples of malicious pleasures, the agent’s character is likely to affect
our intuitions. So, for example, it is plausible that there is substantial
disvalue in X’s having a personality which can derive pleasure from
torturing other sentient beings. A hedonist will agree that there is likely
to be instrumental disvalue in X’s being disposed to derive pleasure
from torture – for this disposition is likely to lead to disvalue by
generating pain for other agents.17 And, as Smart points out, when
a character trait will nearly always be instrumentally bad it is difficult
to avoid moving from ascribing instrumental disvalue to the character
trait, to ascribing final disvalue to it, to ascribing final disvalue to the
pleasure that goes with that character trait.18
In addition to thewrongness of the act, and the instrumental disvalue
of malicious persons, there seems to be another distracting influence
on our intuitions. This is the fact that examples of malicious pleasures
tend to involve cases in which an unnecessary pain is brought about –
such as Y’s being tortured. We can neutralize the influence of this
fact, and perhaps make malicious pleasures less counterintuitive, by
considering an example in which an agent takes malicious pleasure in
inflicting a pain that is non-gratuitous.
For example, let us compare two cases in both of which a dentist
performs a painful tooth extraction on a patient to prevent future
17 On this see G. Harman, Explaining Value (New York, 2000), p. 140.
18 Smart in J. J. C. Smart and B.Williams,Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge,
1973), p. 26.
470 Guy Fletcher
toothache:
Sadistic dentist: The dentist (indiscernibly) experiences pleasure from the
unavoidable pain the patient experiences from the procedure.
Ordinary dentist: The dentist (indiscernibly) experiences neither pain nor
pleasure from the unavoidable pain the patient experiences from the procedure.
The amount of pain experienced by the patient is equal in each case. Let
us also stipulate that the sadistic dentist enjoys the pain the patient
experiences, but he performs the procedure as painlessly as possible,
so his experiencing malicious pleasure does not cause him to inflict
unnecessary pain. It seems clear that this is malicious pleasure, as the
sadistic dentist experiences pleasure in the pain of another, but it does
not seem so obviously incorrect to ascribe final value to this pleasure.
Perhaps very few examples of malicious pleasure will be like this.
The point remains that it does not seem counterintuitive to ascribe
final value to the pleasure of the sadistic dentist. This suggests that
some of our intuitions against the final value of malicious pleasure
stem from distracting, and illegitimate, considerations.
Some will remain unconvinced by this. They will think that the
outcome where the ordinary dentist performs the procedure is a better
one, despite its lacking pleasure. My claim is not that we can make
malicious pleasures entirely intuitively acceptable. Rather I claim
that reflecting on the dentist case, especially in comparison with the
torture case discussed earlier, makes it less obviously counterintuitive
to ascribe final value to malicious pleasure. If this is so, it helps to
establish the point that some of our intuitive reluctance to recognize the
final value ofmalicious pleasure stems from illegitimate considerations.
This is significant even if we reject hedonism. For even if hedonism
is misguided in granting value to all malicious pleasures, the correct
conclusion to draw is not that malicious pleasures never have value. At
least in the case of the sadistic dentist as I described it, there is some
final value in his taking pleasure in the other’s pain.
In summary, I have explained three different ways for the hedonist
to try to make it less counterintuitive to claim that malicious pleasures
hold final value. The first of these was to argue that the malicious
pleasure is valuable, but that this does not affect the deontic status
of the act. Ascribing value to a malicious pleasure does not require
hedonism to say that the act should be performed. The second tack was
to argue that our intuitions about such cases are unreliable because of a
tendency to allow evaluation of the agent to affect our attitude towards
malicious pleasures. Third, I argued that there are cases in which it
does seem plausible to ascribe final value to malicious pleasures, such
as when we compare the sadistic dentist with the ordinary dentist.
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In the first part of this article I argued that qualitative hedonism
is coherent, and can be consistently monistic about value. I did not
argue that qualitative hedonism is well motivated. My more modest
aim was to undermine the long-standing allegation that qualitative
hedonism is incoherent or pluralistic. In the second part of this article
I provided a case for ascribing final value to at least some tokens of
malicious pleasure. If somemalicious pleasures, such as the pleasure of
the sadistic dentist, do hold final value then this perhapsmarks the first
step towards a defence of the hedonist from the objection frommalicious
pleasure. Even if such a defence is not forthcoming, we have still seen
that there are malicious pleasures that are plausible candidates for
holding final value.19
G.Fletcher@Reading.ac.uk
19 I regret that, owing to its recent appearance, I have not been able to incorporate Roger
Crisp’s interesting discussion of Mill’s qualitative hedonism from his recent Reasons and
the Good (Oxford, 2006).
